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ABSTRACT
Scandals accompany and belong to public debates about Russian identity, past and present. Although they seem to 
be “public”, there is a lot of state influence, especially when the state stages scandals in the mass media in order 
to control discourse production in dealing with Russian collective memory and its past. This paper deals with the 
scandalization of the film Matil’da (Uchitel’, 2017) owing to its “wrong” interpretation of the character of the last 
Russian tsar Nicholas II. The scandalization is accompanied by legitimization of a powerful state and a powerful 
ruler for the modern Russian Federation. Moreover, it is committed to Russian collective memory as well. The 
reasons, methods, and forms of scandalization and marginalization of the film in Russian media space will be 
discussed, and the political motives contributing to the marginalization of the film will be shown. Based on various 
sources (newspapers, film reviews, posts on social networks), the dynamics, actors and interest groups of the scandal 
will be analyzed. Factors of prohibition and release of the film will be in the foreground of consideration. The 
research method is critical discourse analysis.
Keywords: sacralization of public space, censorship, marginalization, scandal, Russian cinema, Matilda.
Cinematography is a social practice and closely connected with the political life 
of the country in which films are produced. Especially in Russia, the social and political 
preconditions are decisive for the perception and understanding of modern cinematography, 
where the “growing ideological homogenization of the public sphere” and the social need of 
belonging to the majority has reached its climax (Kukulin, 2018: 223; Smola, Lipovetsky, 
2018: 3). 
The methods of dealing with film and cinema in Russia are determined by the state’s 
“soft-authoritarian control”, ideological agenda-setting in cinema since the 2000s and the 
appearance of new taboos since 2012 like “falsifying history” and “insulting the feelings 
of religious believers” (cf. Wilmes, 2018: 297–300). At the same time, the imperial idea 
has become increasingly popular, and the connection of orthodoxy and authoritarianism as 
constitutive elements of the Russian nation (following the 19th century Russian ideological 
doctrine of the official nation) has been upgraded and adopted to modern Russian relationships 
(cf. Kukulin, 2018: 226). The close connection between the imperial idea, authoritarianism 
and orthodoxy is thereby linked to the construction of sanctity of the royal Romanov dynasty, 
when the last Russian tsar Nicholas II and his relatives were beatified in the early 2000s. This 
sacralization of the royal family is supported by the state and serves the legitimization of a 
powerful state and a powerful ruler for the modern Russian Federation. The mystification 
and idealization of the last tsar thus remains connected to Russian collective memory, old 
myths of the “good tsar” and “bad persons around him”. Russian history, cultural memory 
and identity therefore come together in the figure of the last tsar, whose positive image has 
been used in modern Russia for political purposes.
Cinematography reflects these developments in Russian politics, culture and society, 
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so there are many (documentary) films discussing the tragic fate of Nicholas II. The 
popularization of the last tsar in contemporary Russian collective consciousness can be 
considered as sacralization of the public space and nostalgia of the imperial past, which have 
been functionalized for the construction of new historical narratives and commemorations 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time “wrong” (less positive) depictions 
of the last tsar get marginalized as part of what can be understood as a modern form of 
censorship. Especially in recent years, the crisis of symbolical orders and the homogenization 
of norms have taken on such large dimensions that the main principle of the new state ideology 
has been openly formulated (not least in the habilitation of the Russian Minister of Culture 
Vladimir Medinskiĭ and the scandal around it): history should be rewritten in accordance with 
the current national political interests of the Russian Federation (cf. Kukulin, 2018: 222). The 
high impact of digital media on the spreading of these ideas should also be mentioned (cf. 
Burkhardt, 2018: 19; Smola, Lipovetsky, 2018: 7). 
Regarding these observations, this paper will try to figure out the reasons, for which 
modern Russian films get socially and politically marginalized in media and public space, 
and identify the methods and forms of marginalization. How the films become political events 
or scandals will be investigated. These research questions will be exemplified by the film 
Matil’da (Uchitel’, 2017) which became a scandal in early spring 2017 because of its “wrong 
representation of the person of the last Russian tsar and Russian history” (cf. Za otmenu, 
2017). The involvement of state politics of memory culture, the Russian Orthodox Church, 
conservative political powers and the opposition in the dynamics of the scandal makes this 
film suitable for a case study on the marginalization of films with content unwelcome for 
contemporary Russian national identity.
It is worth underscoring that Matil’da is only a feature film without any claim to truth. 
The film tells a love story of the future Emperor Nicholas II with a ballet dancer Matil’da 
Kshesinskaia, which has been understood as providing a wrong interpretation of the 
character of the last Russian tsar. Although the film is a fiction and product of fantasy, it 
has been considered by some viewers as reality and representation of a real story, which 
enables the film to be considered as an example of the specific scandal culture, representing 
power relations in contemporary Russian society. In this regard, this paper neither strives to 
provide an interpretation and evaluation of the “historical truth” of the film plot, nor to offer 
a review and discussion of its artistic value, nor to make a plea for any of the actors involved 
in the scandal. Above all, it aims to analyze the dynamics of the scandal: the reasons for its 
scandalization, trouble spots, the interests of various political groups involved in the scandal, 
and the methods and forms of marginalization of this “unwelcome” film. These dynamics 
will be investigated along the turning points of the scandal (announcement, expert enquiry, 
premiere) and the political interest groups involved at each stage of the scandal.
In the research literature, it has often been emphasized that nonconformist culture, 
which “reflects the extremely negative transformations of the Russian political regime”, 
gets marginalized in contemporary Russian public space (Smola, Lipovetsky, 2018: 9). 
Although Matil’da has been harshly criticized, it cannot be seen as a “nonconformist” film. 
The film production was state funded, and the film director Alekseĭ Uchitel’ is loyal to the 
political regime (Baklanov, 2017). Moreover, the film is not explicitly directed against the 
state ideology. Although the film reached an audience of two million and the exhibition of 
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costumes used in the film was successful, it brought less financial income than expected, 
in spite of the strong scandalized presence of the film in the print and online media. These 
ambivalences led to the understanding of the film as a “failed scandal” (Krasheninnikov, 
2017).
The scandalization of Matil’da can be considered as a modern strategy of censorship 
which aims at controlling discourse production in accordance with social rules, because 
“every scandal has a normative function” and reflects a “historically grown concept for 
the public negotiation of norms” (Burkhardt, 2018: 26).  This enables us to investigate the 
scandalization of the film from the critical discourse analysis point of view and to focus on the 
social and political implications of the scandal. The marginalization of “unwelcome” films 
is therefore an effect of authoritative control practices which keep under surveillance the 
spread and reproduction of social discourses, so that “welcomed” discourses are supported 
by authorities while “unwelcome” discourses are crossed out. While Foucault distinguishes 
between three types of control through exclusion (prohibition) (Bachleitner, 2017: 22–
26; Foucault, 2007: 16–17), new approaches criticize this binary opposition between the 
accepted and the excluded and consider discourse as a “polyvalent constellation” with 
various perspectives and forms (Smola, Lipovetsky, 2018: 9). This observation is especially 
appropriate to Matil’da because of its complex entanglement in state funding mechanisms, 
various political actors and interests, national consciousness, religious debates etc. and an 
unclear position between loyalty to the Russian state and subversion, between showing 
“historical truth” and provocation and profanation. 
The sources relevant for this investigation are newspaper articles, film reviews, interviews 
with officials of the Russian Federation (above all, with Nataliia Poklonskaia), television and 
online programs of various interest groups involved in the scandal (the National Duma, the 
religious fundamentalists, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
the central government, art critics, journalists etc.). Particular attention should be paid to 
the representation of moral and political values, and social norms by the different interest 
groups involved in the scandal (cf. Burkhardt, 2018: 33, 36). In our case, we can distinguish 
between three areas of protection through censorship: religious feelings, moral values and 
state interests (cf. Bachleitner, 2017: 27–32).
The scandalization of Russian films is not a rare contemporary phenomenon. It has a long 
tradition from Soviet times, where the most prominent example is the film Agoniia (Klimov, 
1982) (Agony), which had a religious content. But films discussing religion were not held 
in contempt for a long time in the modern Russian Federation (specifically until 2012). With 
only a superficial study of the Russian filmography since 2000 (the so-called Putin era) we 
can easily find some approaches similar to the scandalized and marginalized Matil’da. The 
film Liubov’ imperatora (Grigor’ev, Orlov, 2003) (‘Love of the Emperor’) tells a love story 
of the tsar Alexander II and princess Dolgorukova, and the film Zvezda imperii (Mazurenko, 
Sokolov, 2007) (‘Star of the Empire’) even has the same plot as Matil’da. None of these films 
caused a sensation or scandalization. These examples show that the Russian audience should 
be familiar with such cinematic topics as illegitimate love of the Russian rulers, so Matil’da 
should not have provoked a shock. 
There are many reasons why Matil’da has become so explosive. Although all the 
films mentioned were produced in the Putin era, since 2012 new socio-political goals, 
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national interests and challenges have been formulated and have caused a crisis of social 
norms and polarization of the society. These sociopolitical changes have contributed to a 
new understanding of history and its role in the present so “what was acceptable yesterday, 
becomes sensationally nonconformist today” (Smola, Lipovetsky, 2018: 9).
The scandal began with a public petition on Change.org in March 2017, half a year 
before the premiere of the film, to ban Matil’da because it insulted the religious feelings of 
the orthodox believers (cf. Za otmenu, 2017). Nataliia Poklonskaia, a member of the National 
Duma, supported this petition appealing to moral values and initiated an enquiry of the film 
to gather “objective” arguments for prohibition. The grounds for that were protection of 
children and young persons, protection of religious feelings and the collision of the film’s 
representation of Nicholas II with his official canonical image. At the same time, some other 
reasons were implied: the film should have produced an analogy between ecclesiastical and 
mundane power, and the sexuality represented in the film should be suppressed. Poklonskaia 
went from being only an official at the beginning of the scandal to becoming personally 
involved in it. Her opinions were transmitted as a kind of “truth” through various print and 
digital mass media. Although she saw only the two-minute trailer and not the whole film, her 
“right” interpretation massively influenced the discussions about the film. The German actor 
Lars Eidinger, who played Nicholas II in the film, was wrongly considered by Poklonskaia 
as a “porn actor” and “Satanist”.  According to Poklonskaia, the film is anti-Christian and 
extremist because it insults the feelings of religious believers and discredits Russia by 
showing magic and occultist rituals, falsifying historical facts and profanation (Car’grad TV, 
2017, June 6). 
The wrong depiction of Russia is thereby the main argument at the beginning of the 
scandal. Poklonskaia sees herself as the sole “rescuer” of Russian culture and society, a 
phenomenon in contemporary Russian society known as “messianic cynicism”. She applies 
the “unique historical mission [of Russia] to implement universalist moral values forgotten 
by the West” to her own activities as a member of parliament (Kukulin, 2018: 231).
One of the most important interest groups who fought against Matil’da were orthodox 
fundamentalists, who have little to do with orthodoxy but functionalize it for their 
nationalistic purposes. The methods of contempt were intimidation, violence, arson, and 
threats. Appealing to the collective memory of Russians, orthodox fundamentalists are a 
destructive factor in the public understanding of Russian orthodoxy. The staging of public 
prayers against the film in front of cinema centers was almost the only legal method used by 
this interest group, so the belief was directly connected to authoritarian political goals. The 
slogan “Za veru! Za Otechestvo! Za narod i caria” (“For belief! For fatherland! For people 
and tsar!”) converted such prayers into political demonstrations where the interests of the 
right wing were articulated (cf. Za veru, 2017). Therefore, not only church and religion but 
also contemporary Russian cinema have been used flexibly as instruments for nationalist 
purposes.
The Russian Orthodox Church claimed the right to assess works of art, spoke from a 
position of protection of religious feelings and demanded the banning of the film. Matil’da 
was understood by the church as a lie providing a caricature of the tsar and non-canonical 
depiction of saints. The tastelessness of the film and the “wrong” approach of the film 
director were criticized (Car’grad TV, 2017, October 12). At the same time, the Russian 
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Orthodox Church distanced itself from the orthodox fundamentalists and underlined that 
they cannot speak in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church (Futur’e, 2017). The voices 
of various clergymen during the whole scandal were mostly repetitive and brought no other 
plausible arguments to the discussion. The involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
the scandal around the film shows that the church not only has ecclesiastic but also political 
interests regarding collective memory and strengthening of authoritarianism. The church is 
therefore seen as an “institution with political functions” and a political technologist which 
fights against Western liberalism as heresy (Knorre, Kharish, 2018: 365–366, 370, 373). The 
reciprocal relationship between Russian politics and the church finds its expression within 
this scandal because the political actors need religious arguments to articulate their critique 
on the film, while the church develops activities in the political field (cf. Knorre, 2014: 42).
The enquiry of the film initiated by Poklonskaia built a belated basis for arguments by 
enemies of the film. Conducted by leading scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
and published online by Poklonskaia, the thirty-page report was based on the method of 
semiology, so the research interest was directed to details of the film and single signs. When 
reading the text, the exact and methodologically correct analysis of the single signs appears 
convincing; however, the lack of their generalization in the context of the film as a work of 
art makes the research results tendentious and implausible. The experts presupposed that the 
film has “religious content” which has been contaminated through vulgarity and sexuality. 
The report also speaks about antinormativity, provocation and profanation in this “ahistorical 
film”, although there was never a claim of historical exactness. The title of the enquiry 
was formulated very carefully. This text was considered by its authors only as a “mnenie 
spetsialistov” (opinion of specialists) and not as an “objective assessment” of the film, but 
this was ignored by enemies of the film. They only considered the enquiry as a basis for 
further actions (Slobodchikov et al., 2017: 1–39).
Officials of the Russian government gave only neutral assessments of the film. Vladimir 
Putin appeared not to be involved in the scandal and said in one of his interviews that 
there were no attempts to ban the film. However, the various interests of multicultural 
and multi-religious Russian population should be respected, so he pleaded for productive 
dialogue between the different interest groups involved in the scandal (Novosti na Pervom 
Kanale, 2017, June 15). Dmitriĭ Medvedev called the critique of the film an expression of 
intolerance and aggression (Car’grad TV, 2017, April 25). Vladimir Medinskiĭ spoke about a 
“bacchanalia of democracy” regarding the scandal around Matil’da. He also mentioned that 
he did not know anything about the enquiry initiated by Poklonskaia (Filimonov, 2017). It 
should be mentioned that this enquiry was not taken into account for approval of the film by 
the Russian Ministry of Culture. These statements show that the Russian government did not 
recognize the supposed danger of the film as perceived by church-related political powers.
The religious fundamentalists were not satisfied with the reserved commentaries of the 
Russian officials and developed new methods of showing their contempt for the film. The 
YouTube video “Lozh’ Matil’dy” (The Lie of Matilda) as answer to neutral and positive 
statements about the film was their initiative. The video “Stop Matil’da. Pravoe delo Natal’i 
Poklonskoĭ” (Stop Matilda. Nataliia Poklonskaia’s Right Thing) continued the resistance 
of religious fundamentalists against Matil’da. These videos contain compensation of the 
“wrong” depictions provided in Matil’da. They presume to tell the “whole truth” about 
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the tsar and explain the history of the whole Romanov dynasty while brightening up the 
depictions of Russian tsars (Car’grad TV, 2017, April 18; Pervyĭ Mezhdunarodnyĭ Pozitivnyĭ 
portal, 2017, October 3). Such a reproduction of old imperial narratives has been promoted 
as a form of patriotism.
The defenders of the film are also heterogenous. The constellation was compared with 
the ban of Pasternak’s novel “Doctor Zhivago” (Pervyĭ kanal, 2017, February 14). The art 
critics assessed the film as a “beautiful melodrama” and “adolescent love story”, rather than 
a work of art dealing with fundamental problems of Russian history and culture, and did not 
see any religious content, although many art critics emphasized the weakness of the film 
plot. The large dimension of the scandal around Matil’da was considered as a factor for 
increasing interest in the film (Didenko, 2017, October 26). There were also some defenders 
in the National Duma who claimed that  Poklonskaia functionalized Matil’da to wage an 
information war and to distract the society from  relevant current problems (Tot, 2017, 
September 18).
The answer to enemies of the film manifested itself in a satirical cartoon produced by a 
regime-critical YouTube channel “Zapovednik” (“Nature reserve”). The plot of the cartoon 
contains allusions to events concerning the scandal and various references to Poklonskaia’s 
speeches, while Poklonskaia is represented as a mad person jealous of the last Russian tsar 
(Zapovednik, 2017, October 25). The satire is considered as a resistance strategy providing 
a comic look at the scandal and explaining its absurdity through allegory and elements of 
fairy-tale.
Observing these dynamics of the scandal, we can define some methods and forms of 
marginalization of the film because of its “unwelcome” and “controversial” content.  In 
addition to legal mechanisms to ban the film like petitions, appointed protest actions (and 
even public prayers), enquiry etc. there are some subtle forms of marginalization, such 
as non-legally binding recommendations issued by regional governments addressed to 
cinema centers to cancel screenings of Matil’da. This mechanism can be considered as a 
pressure of cinema centers. Due to the escalation of the scandal, some cinemas cancelled the 
screenings on their own initiative (Radio Svoboda, 2017, September 11). The main trend is 
that the Russian Federation is developing more direct mechanisms of control of the cinema 
whereby the prevention of the film screenings is essential for understanding state strategies 
of discursive surveillance (Wilmes, 2018: 301, 310). The Thus, a part of the audience lost 
interest in seeing the film because of its negative (controversial) image in the mass media. 
Illegal methods to ban the film were also present during the scandal around Matil’da. Those 
were threats, intimidation and force, although the police stopped these riots very promptly 
(Krasheninnikov, 2017). 
There were various motivating issues to act against the film. The religious issue was 
about the protection of religious feelings of orthodox believers; the moral one about the 
protection of children and young persons. From the state perspective, the extremist content 
of the film had to be banned. However, the film neither contains any reference to religion, nor 
shows any obscene scenes, nor has extremist content. The main problem of Matil’da is that 
the film is dealing with a sensitive point of Russian imperial history which is relevant for the 
contemporary collective memory and essential for the legitimation of the new political order. 
The activation of collective memory contributed to the escalation of the scandal; nevertheless, 
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none of the involved parties saw the film. The scandal around Matil’da resulted in a fight for 
the Russian past and the Russian national pride, whose leader was undoubtedly Poklonskaia. 
The orthodox activists even saw in the fight against the film “the consolidation of Russian 
population” (Car’grad TV, 2017, April 17). The real content of the film therefore did not 
matter, and public discussions about the film were conducted without any knowledge of it.
The case study on the scandalization of Matil’da in Russian online media mirrors 
current socio-political problems of the Russian Federation. The rapid socio-political changes 
provoked a crisis of norms which led, on the one hand, to a re-evaluation of imperial 
narratives and their deeper incorporation into narrative frames of the contemporary Russian 
collective memory. On the other hand, the strong presence of the imperial past in the present 
is a destructive factor and burden which inhibits the search for new narratives and ways of 
dealing with history and national identity. These conclusions show that the scandalization 
of the film was pre-programmed from the very beginning of its production, because of its 
complicated culture for Russian memory and the multi-layered content and characteristics of 
the Russian political regime since 2012. 
Apart from the crisis of norms and their homogenization, there are some other trouble 
spots. We can observe a change of idea as to who is allowed to judge on works of art, whereby 
the church and religious fundamentalists have become more important in discussions about 
works of art, but nevertheless lack the necessary expertise in this field. The next problem of 
contemporary Russian cinema is whether national interests’ point of view should prevail in 
the production and review of works of art as the only “right” perspective and to what extent 
the self-censorship of filmmakers might influence Russian cinema. Due to this turning point 
of Russia’s (cultural) politics, many works of art have become sensationally “nonconformist” 
and have been marginalized in the Russian public space. The censorship is complemented 
through self-censorship of filmmakers, and the category of madness becomes more important 
for marginalizing unwelcome content.
Observing the dynamics of the scandal around Matil’da, it is impossible to figure out 
to what extent public opinion in modern Russia is really “public”, because most of the 
protagonists of the scandal have a close connection with the Russian central government. 
There are no clear answers to these questions in the Russian media space. Diverse ideologies, 
concepts and strategies of dealing with the new social order are present, although the main 
trend is the increase of the state ideological and patriotic control of the cinema.  Thus, the 
director Alekseĭ Uchitel’ stands in an in-between space and pivots between the state national 
interests and a critical look at the roots of the contemporary Russian memory culture. This 
location allows him to reach success in dealing with state bureaucracy and funding without 
manipulating the film as a work of art. 
Although Matil’da had been approved by the Russian Ministry of Culture, the 
scandalization of the film demonstrated the potential to act of various interest groups involved 
in the scandal. The strongest actor was the Russian central government which has the power 
to decide about the approval of films. Although each interest group had its own truth and 
“alternative facts”, the film was mainly used as a way of strengthening the royal sanctity and 
sacrificing of the last tsar. It would be naïve to see in the approval of Matil’da a positive sign. 
The film was approved not least because of the state funding, corruption and support of the 
Russian government. Therefore, the state determines what should (can) be a scandal, given 
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that some other films have been banned without any public discussion. The strong presence of 
officials and actors closely connected with the Russian central government implies the state 
surveillance of the scandal, which was not really a free discussion about the Russian memory 
culture. The scandal not only contributed to more attention to the film but also to a positive 
image of the state, which instead of banning the controversial film approved it and therefore 
engaged for the “freedom” of the arts in the Russian Federation. In fact, the film contains 
neither social critique nor any reference to contemporary Russian politics and society, so it 
could not be dangerous for the current political regime. Therefore, it is questionable whether 
another (more critical) film will (would) be treated in the same mild way as Matil’da.
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